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CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CANADIAN ABORIGINAL LAW
GUY C CHARLTON* AND XIANG GAO**
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that aboriginal rights in Canada have been greatly affected by 19th 
century governmental and social conflicts within the Canadian colonial state. These 
conflicts, largely over the ownership of land and regulatory authority between the federal 
government and the provinces necessarily impacted the First Nations on the ground while
affecting how their legal claims were recognized and implemented. In particular they 
impacted the legal efficacy of treaty rights, the scope of rights recognised by the courts 
and an expansive legally protected notion of indigenous sovereignty. As a result, the 
rights now protected under sec. 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 are more 
restricted than the text might imply.
I INTRODUCTION
The  confederation  of  the  United  Province  of  Canada,  Nova  Scotia,  and  New  Brunswick
transferred whatever authority the colonies held over First Nations affairs to the new federal
government. Within this legal regime, inherited from pre-confederation law and practice and the
British North America Act 1867, aboriginal rights were uncertain and precarious. First, there was
considerable uncertainty about the legal source and status of treaty regarding aboriginal rights.
The law was an amalgamation of common law rights, customary practices, statutory enactments,
international legal doctrines, imperial and colonial policy and imperial prerogative instruments
such as the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Second, there was uncertainty about the content and the
scope of the rights. Third, there was uncertainty about how aboriginal and treaty rights related to
provincial authority within the federal system. Finally, the rights were subject to the doctrine of
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parliamentary supremacy and were subject to regulation and extinguishment by legislation.1 
This uncertainty was made more tenuous by the need to work out the basis and scope of the new
provinces’ and the Dominion’s authority under the  British North America Act 1867 (hereafter
Constitution Act, 1867).  While often treated as separate areas of legal inquiry, the development
of Canadian aboriginal law occurred as part of a process where the larger Canadian polity and
courts were giving form to the federal-provincial relationship outlined in the  Constitution Act
1867.  The recognition, incorporation or disregard of First Nations’ territories, customary law
and governmental entities and aboriginal individuals involved fundamental constitutional values
such as:  parliamentary sovereignty,  federalism, separation of powers,  rule of law and voting
rights;  the  political  and/or  judicial  determination  of  scope  of  constitutional  authority;  and
constitutional innovation concerning the authority of governmental institutions, individual rights
and equality. 
This paper argues that aboriginal rights in Canada have been greatly affected by 19th century
governmental and social conflicts within the Canadian colonial state.  These conflicts, largely
over the ownership of land and regulatory authority between the federal government and the
provinces necessarily impacted the First Nations on the ground while affecting how their legal
claims were recognized and implemented. In particular they impacted the legal efficacy of treaty
rights, the scope of rights recognised by the courts and an expansive legally protected notion of
indigenous  sovereignty.  As  a  result,  the  rights  now  protected  under  ss  25  and  35  of  the
Constitution  Act  1982 tilt  more  heavily  toward  usufructuary  and cultural  site  specific  rights
rather than arising a more proprietary conception of aboriginal title.  
II ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND CANADIAN CONSTITUTION
Aboriginal  law  and  legal  doctrine,  which  seeks  to  reconcile,  ‘aboriginal  peoples  and  non-
aboriginal peoples and their respective claims, interests and ambitions’, has been incorporated
and subsumed into a larger set of constitutional principles and the constitutional and statutory
law of the Canadian state.2 This law exists as, ‘one of the ways in which people make sense of
the world around them and make it  coherent’ while  they grope for  a  particular  identity  and
political culture. Contested since the establishment of the British North American colonies and
1 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (The Carswell Company Limited, 2nd ed, 1985), 563-568.
2 Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage) [2006] 1 CNLR 78,[1] (Binnie, J).
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their  subsequent  confederation as  a  federal  state  in 1867,  the legal  framework manages  the.
‘claims, interests and ambitions’ of individuals and groups while establishing governmental and
federal structures which give rise to additional interests. In this way, conflicts which involve the
general nature of the federal system, the division of powers, and individual and collective rights
impact on aboriginal law because they were initially  grounded in the conscious act of nation-
building;  a  process  intimately  intertwined  with  larger  issues  of  territory,  self-government,
community, diversity and sovereignty.
First Nations were not completely ignored in the Constitution Act 1867. The basic principles of
protection,  assimilation  and  civilization  established  by  the  imperial  government  and  pre-
confederation colonial policy remained.3 However, the tribal interests as collective de facto self-
governing  entities  with  nearly  exclusive  control  of  their  populations,  finances,  and  lands
established by earlier imperial policy from 1763 to 1860 were dramatically changed.4 After the
constitutional assignation of institutional responsibilities and jurisdiction for the tribes and their
lands, their interests and rights became in part the interests of various institutional, governmental
or non-indigenous groups. The federal government, granted paramount authority over, ‘Indians,
and Lands reserved for Indians,’ under s 91(24) assumed institutional responsibility for the tribes
and took extensive control of the reserves and tribes in the 1876 Indian Act. The provinces, had
‘exclusive’ jurisdiction  over  local  affairs,  including  the  ‘property  and  Civil  Rights  in  the
Province’ under s 92(13), ownership of ‘all lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to
the several Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at the Union’ under s 109,
and the continued retention of their respective ‘public property not otherwise disposed of’ under
s 117. Armed with these powers and legislative competence the provinces were determined, for
material, political, ideological and philosophical reasons, to retain their local authority against
federal encroachment. As both levels of governments grounded their existence and actions in a
conscious act of nation-building, a process intimately intertwined with larger issues of; territory,
self-government,  community, diversity and sovereignty  the tribes pre-European occupation of
3 John L Tobias, ‘Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada’s Indian Policy’ in Ian A.L. 
Getty and Antoine S. Lussier, (eds), As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native 
Studies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1983), 39.
4 John S. Milloy, ‘The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strategy and Constitutional Change’ in J.R. Miller, ed. 
Sweet Promises A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) 145.  
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North America and the unique legal  and constitutional  arrangements  which arose from their
presence  were  entangled  in  the  constitutional  and  political  disputes  within  the  developing
Canadian state.
This is not to say that constitutional and institutional disputes are the only determinant of the
existence and scope aboriginal rights in Canada.  With increased European settlement, Miller
notes: ‘the Indians ceased to be allies and economic partners [and] they increasingly assumed the
roles of obstacle to development and consumer of public funds.’5 The shift of power away from
the tribes, which allowed colonial governments to show less solicitude for tribal interests, was
accompanied by the development of more unitary and euro-centric conceptions of sovereign and
national authority.6 Unlike the Americans who developed view that the tribes retained an inherent
authority  based  on  the  pre-contact  occupation  and  use  of  territory,  the  British  and  settlers
replaced the idea of a juridical equality for the tribes. ‘As the settler state consolidated it sense of
self,’ Paul McHugh writes, ‘it tended to increasingly see and treat aboriginal peoples as part of
and entirely subject to its own sovereignty rather than as separate polities.’7 From the settler’s
point of view, the issue of political authority and sovereignty was increasingly understood as a
fight for a liberal conception local responsible government under a unified sovereign imperial
crown. 8 These changing conceptions were reinforced by Imperial policy. As the Colonial Office
committed to settler self-government in the mid-19th century, the ability of imperial authorities to
implement  an  effective  protective  policy,  which  had  always  been  somewhat  rhetorical  and
tenuous in practice, simply disappeared.9  
At the same time the imperialist and colonial project inexorably led to the creation of boundaries
and the assignation of various characteristics which separated the ‘civilized’ European from the
indigenous inhabitants. The dispossession of indigenous territories and the destruction and/or
appropriation of indigenous groups and knowledge are concomitant with  of imperialism and
colonialism. As Smith explains: 
5 Ibid 98.
6 Paul G McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, Status, and Self-
Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 117-159.
7Ibid 127.
8 Robert C Vipond, ‘Lament For a Notion: The Eclipse of Reform Liberalism’ in Joseph F Fletcher, Ed., Ideas in 
Action: Essays on Politics and Law in Honour of Peter Russell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 24-36, 
25-26.
9 David T. McNab, ‘Herman Merivale and Colonial Office Indian Policy’ in Ian A.L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier, 
(eds), As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies (UBC Press, 1983) 85.
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Imperialism  was  the  system  of  control  which  secured  the  markets  and  capital  investments.
Colonialism facilitated this expansion by ensuring that there was European control, which necessarily
meant securing and subjugating the indigenous populations.10
Where early settlement led to laws and policies more solicitous of aboriginal rights, the totalizing
logic of colonialism and imperialism undermined them over time.11
At the same time, jurisprudence and policy were increasingly influenced by sociological factors
such as racial and cultural stereotypes.12 For example, Kent McNeil argues that Social Darwinist
thought and racism formed an increasingly virulent context to Canadian Indian policy. These
conceptions influenced judicial  conceptions of aboriginal rights.13  The major themes of this
racial theory reinforced the belief that non-Caucasians were inferior as a result of their inherent
‘uncivilised’ or ‘primitive’ characteristics which in turn informed conceptions of aboriginal title.
The depreciation of cultural and racial characteristics extended into the notion that the tribes had
neither the requisite law nor intellectual inclination to have possessory interests in the territories
they occupied. Cottom notes that the non-legal notion of aboriginal title was conceived by David
Mills’, an advisor to the Ontario in St. Catherines Milling and Lumber Co. case.14 For Mills, the
acknowledgement of Indian title did not mean that the Indian actually had title to the lands they
occupied; the Crown possessed full title to all their lands through the Doctrine of Discovery. The
treaty  process,  which  arguably  implied  that  aboriginal’s  held  a  possessory  interests  ‘did  not
originate in the want, or the supposed want, of a sufficient title in the Crown’, but was due to the
‘scruples of Puritan and Quaker settlers’ who paid Indians as a matter of conscience rather than
as a matter of legal obligation.15 Any interest recognised either in a treaty, or any other legal
instrument was ‘a matter of public policy, determined by political considerations….’ This notion
was adopted  by the  Chancellor  Boyd,  who opined without  evidence  that  the  Ojibwe Treaty
10  Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (Zed Books Ltd, 1999), 
21.
11 John C Weaver, The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900 (Montreal: McGill-
Queens University Press, 2003), 151.
12 Sidney L Harring, Native People in Nineteenth-Century Canadian Jurisprudence (University of Toronto Press, 
1998).
13 Kent McNeil, ‘Social Darwinism and Judicial Conceptions of Indian Title in Canada in the 1880s’, (1999) 38 
Journal of the West 1, 68.
14 S. Barry Cottam, ‘Indian Title as a Celestial Institution: David Mills and the St. Catherine’s Milling Case’ in 
Kerry Abel and Jean Friesen, eds. Aboriginal Resource Use in Canada: Historical and Legal Aspects (Winnipeg, 
Manitoba: University of Manitoba Press, 1991) 247.
15 Ibid 257-258.
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partners were, ‘more than [the] usually degraded Indian type’ in the lower Court in  the  St.
Catherines Milling and Lumber Co. case. For Chancellor Boyd, ‘the claim of the Indians by
virtue of their original occupation is not such as to give any title to land itself; but only serves to
commend  them  to  the  consideration  and  liberality  of  the  Government  upon  their
displacement…’16 Cotton notes that Mills arrived at these non-legal notions of Indian title due to
his acceptance of Anglo-Saxon supremacy and his antipathy to collectivist notions of property
rights.17 
Nevertheless, while this background context of imperial colonial  expansion and racialist bias
informs  legal  developments,  it  was  channeled  and  contested  through  the  constitutional
framework  and  the  legal  system.  In  Post-Confederation  Canada,  federal  and  provincial
politicians struggled over the fundamental nature of the federal union and the scope of federal
and  provincial  powers.18 The  disputes  not  only  involved  fundamental  imperial,  national  and
settler  political  and  economic  interests  but  also  were  about  fundamental  political  and  legal
philosophies regarding the nature and extent of the developing national state. They were framed
by common law legal  doctrines,  antecedent  political  and policy  choices,  colonial  governing
arrangements as well as a set of beliefs about a particular area of the law or factual situation
which are logically related and internally coherent;  what Samuel has called the ‘structure of
law.’19 This  structure  provided  decision-makers  with  a  mechanism  or  a  rule  of  thumb  for
deciding legal disputes and established the basis for subsequent policy and legal decision-making
as precedent. In the area of aboriginal law, where the legal process was often used for blatantly
immoral purposes or as an instrument of unadulterated power, the structure of the law and the
competing political agendas were often incorporated and reconciled for purposes of the particular
disputes in judicial decisions. Though these opinions often exhibited tortured reasoning, they had
16 Regina v The St. Catherines Milling and Lumber Company, X OR 1885 196, 234. 
17 Ibid 259-60.
18 Benton calls the historical comparative and interpretive study of these processes and conflicts the study of 
“jurisdictional politics.” For Benton, jurisdictional politics means “conflicts over the preservation, creation, nature, 
and the extent of different legal forums and authorities” that arose out of a colonial milieu where the informal law of
the Anglo-settlers, the law of indigenous societies, rules governing the interaction of these groups, and the 
coalescing colonial and national state intersected. Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in 
World History 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 10.
19 “This structure is not, however a structure of rules. It is the structures that one uses to make sense of the world in 
which law applies. It is a matter of structuring the facts.”  Geoffrey Samuel, “Comparative Law and Jurisprudence” 
(1998) 47 I.C.L.Q. 817 at 827.
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significant precedential effects and were incorporated within the doctrine of aboriginal rights in
Canada.
A The Constitution Act 1867, Provincial Rights and St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company
There has been much debate about whether the structure and intent of the Constitution Act, 1867
was  to  create  a  powerful  federal  government  and  the  role  of  the  Judicial  Committee  in
interpreting the document to fit its  a priori  view of a decentralized federal system.20 On one
hand, the document has been understood as providing the federal government with ‘formidable
weapons of centralization’ such as the general power of disallowance over provincial legislation,
of provincial lieutenant-governors and the residual powers under s 91 to make, ‘Laws for the
Peace, Order, and good government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming within the
Classes of Subjects’ assigned exclusively to the provinces in s 92.21 The centralizing thrust of the
document was premised on the idea that the American constitution, which enumerated a short list
of powers to the national government while reserving the remainder to the states and the people
‘commenced  at  the  wrong  end’.22 For  centralists  the  then  raging  American  civil  war  was
empirical proof of the need for strong central authority. On the other hand, the provinces were
granted  exclusive  and extensive  authority  over  local  affairs  in  sec.  92.  These  local  powers,
reflecting a counterargument to centralists such as MacDonald, reflected an underlying diversity
among the provinces and local political  cultures which equated provincial  communities with
individual  freedom.23 As  subsequently  interpreted  by  the  Privy  Council,  this  exclusive
constitutional grant of local authority accorded the provinces substantial autonomy and equal
status with the federal government.
Whatever  the  true  nature  of  the  Constitution  Act  1867,  there  is  no  question  that  after
20 Frederick Vaughan, ‘Critics of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: The New Orthodoxy and Alternative 
Explanation’ (1986) 19 Canadian Journal of Political Science, 495-519; Paul Romney, ‘The Nature and Scope of 
Provincial Autonomy: Oliver Mowat, the Quebec Resolutions and the Construction of the British North America 
Act’ (1992) 25 Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3-28.  
21 Arthur R M Lower, ‘Theories of Canadian Federalism’ in Arthur R M Lower et al., Evolving Canadian 
Federalism (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1958) 3, 14.
22 Eugene Forsey, “In Defence of Macdonald’s Constitution” (1976) 3 Dalhousie Law Journal 529.
23Robert C Vipond, Liberty and Community Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, N.Y:
State University of New York Press, 1991).
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Confederation,  provincial  politicians  advocated an interpretation which tended to expand the
power of the provinces at the expense of the federal government.24 They vehemently objected to
the idea, advocated  that the constitution had set up a subordinate federal system which granted
all residual power to the federal government and contemplated that the provinces be analogous to
municipal  governments.25 In  this  wide  ranging  political  dispute,  the  courts,  particularly  the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council became a significant forum to press for an interpretation
that would provide for expansive provincial power. ‘Its advocates realized that the thing they
wanted—whether  prestige,  power,  protection  of  certain  cultural  values,  or  economic
independence—depended expressly on constitutional  reforms.’26 Over time, the constitutional
perspective led them to develop a “constitutional doctrine of provincial autonomy” which the
courts,  particularly  the  Judicial  Committee,  could  use  to  circumscribe  federal  power.  This
doctrine was premised on the idea that the historically autonomous relationship the colonies  had
had with the Imperial  Crown was not diminished by the creation of Canada,  and a political
theory  which  equated  provincial  rights  with  liberal  individualism.  Among  other  things,  the
dispute  involved  issues  ranging  from  federal-provincial  financing  arrangements,  dual
membership  in  provincial  and  federal  legislatures,  municipal  affairs  and  control  of  the
waterways, the liquor trade,  the role of the Lieutenant-Governor, the federal disallowance of
provincial legislation and control of territory that had been ceded to the tribes to the Dominion.
Vipond outlines the core principles of the doctrine:
First,  the  provincialists  argued  that  the  federal  principle  means,  at  a  minimum,  that  the  federal
government had no right to interfere in those subjects placed within the control  of the provincial
legislatures,  just  as, conversely the provincial  governments have no right to infringe upon federal
jurisdiction.  Federalism means  that  each  level  of  government  is  supreme or  sovereign  within  its
sphere, which is why the BNA Act conferred upon each “exclusive” authority to legislate on a given
set of subjects. Second, the provincialists argued that real federalism requires a balanced division of
power in which neither level overwhelms the other. In this sense, federalism implies political parity,
and the autonomists argued that the division of powers outlined in section 91 and 92 of the BNA Act
24 Christopher Armstrong, The Politics of Federalism: Ontario’s Relations with the Federal Government 1867-1942
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).
25 “Subordinate federalism” is a system whereby provincial governments would have only those powers strictly 
needed for local purposes and which would provide for sectional interests and prejudices. The national government, 
with all remaining authority would protect minorities and achieve constitutional liberty without being subject to the 
pressures of populist democracy. Bruce W Hodgins, ‘Disagreement at Commencement: Divergent Ontarian Views of
Federalism, 1867-1871’ in Donald Swanson, ed. Oliver Mowat’s Ontario (Toronto: MacMillian, 1972) 53, 67-68.
26Vipond, above n 23, 8.
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established  a  rough  balance  between  national  and  provincial  powers  respectively.  Third,  the
provincialists argued that federalism means contractualism. Confederation, they said, was created as a
compact among the provinces which, according to the act’s preamble, had “expressed their desire to
be federally united in one Dominion.27
The constitutional doctrine of provincial autonomy lay at the core of Ontario’s dispute with the
federal government  in the  St.  Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v.  the Queen.28 This  case
concerned the ownership of lands ceded by treaty to the Dominion by the Saulteaux Ojibwa in
1873. However, the dispute had its genesis in the federal purchase of Rupert’s Land (the North
West territory) from the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) in 1867.29 At the time the southeastern
boundary of Rupert’s Land was unclear. Ontario, which had been carved out of the western half
of  the  French  territory  ceded  to  Great  Britain  in  1763,  argued  that  when  King  Charles  II
conveyed Rupert’s Land to the HBC in 1670, the limits of French (Quebec) possessions in North
America extended west  of  Lake Superior  (and thus  were included in the  territory ceded by
France to Great Britain in 1763 and were part of Ontario).30 The federal government disputed this
position and argued that the HBC Rupert’s Land eastern boundary was a line drawn due north
from the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, a boundary which would have seriously
limited the territorial extent of western Ontario. As a purchaser of the HBC territory, the federal
government would control all Crown lands, subject to aboriginal interests at common law or in
the Deed of Surrender from the HBC to the Dominion31 in the territory. If the land was found to
be in Ontario, s 109 held that the province held the proprietary rights. After a protracted dispute,
27 Ibid 5.
28 See, eg, British North America Act 1867, s. 109 (Ont.); St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v the 
Queen (1889) 14 App. Cas. 46 (JCPC) (‘St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co’). The name “St. Catherine’s 
Milling and Lumber Company” had no apostrophe in the title of the case before the Ontario Magistrates Court and 
the Canadian Supreme Court. The lower court’s spelling in used when referring to those cases in this paper.  
29The boundary issue is discussed more thoroughly in J.C. Morrison, “Oliver Mowat and the Development of 
Provincial Rights in Ontario: A Study in Dominion-Provincial Relations” in Chapter 3 in The Ontario Department of
Public Records and Archives, Three History Theses (Toronto, 1961).
30 The federal government subsequently sought reimbursement from Ontario the money it paid to the tribes as a 
result of the 1873 treaty. It was unsuccessful in this action. Canada v. Ontario (1907), 10 Ex. C.R. 445; Exchequer 
Court of Canada; Dominion of Canada v. Province of Ontario [1910] AC 637.
31 Frank J. Tough, ‘Aboriginal Rights Versus the Deed of Surrender: The Legal Rights of Native Peoples and 
Canada's Acquisition of the Hudson's Bay Company Territory’ (1992) 17 Prairie Forum 2, 225-250.
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the Judicial  Committee found in favor of Ontario in 1884.32 The result  was implemented by
imperial legislation in 1889.33 
Nevertheless,  between  the  1884  decision  and  the  1889  imperial  legislation,  the  federal
government did not immediately concede the boundary question or yield control of the resources
in the area. MacDonald, as both Prime Minister and Attorney General, took the position that the
1873 treaty conveyed title of the territory to Dominion as a bona-fide purchaser, thus rendering
irrelevant Ontario’s victory on the boundary extension. MacDonald argued:
The land belonged, so far back as the grant of Charles II could give it, to the Hudson’s Bay Company,
but it was subject to Indian title. They and their ancestors had owned the lands for centuries until the
Dominion Government purchased them. These lands were purchased, not by the province of Ontario
—it  did  not  pay  a  farthing  for  it—but  by  the  Dominion…By  seven  treaties  the  Indians  of  the
Northwest conveyed the lands to Canada; and every acre belongs now to the people of Canada, and
not to the people of Ontario;…there is not one stick of timber, one acre of land, or one lump of lead,
iron or gold that does not belong to the Dominion, or to the people who purchased from the Dominion
government.34 
This logic depended on an expansive interpretation of the s 91(24), which would include within
the phrase ‘lands reserved for Indians’ those areas reserved as hunting grounds under the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 as well  as a recognition that the tribes possessed or owned their  land
subject only to the Crown’s exclusive right of pre-emption.  The treaty, which ‘relieved’ the
Indian title and occupancy rights then resulted in the Dominion holding fee simple title.35 The
Dominion argued that its position was in complete accord with English and American precedent
as ‘from the earliest times the Indians had, and were always recognized as having, a complete
proprietary interest, limited by an imperfect power of alienation.’36
32 After the decision, Oliver Mowat, Premier of Ontario, declared that Ontario had resisted Dominion Prime 
Minister’s John A. MacDonald’s conspiracy to make Ontario “one of the least of the great provinces,” and that 
Ontario now had “an extent of country ample enough to admit of its development, so that, as the other provinces 
develop, so Ontario should develop also” [sic] quoting Randall White, Ontario 1610-1985 A Political and Economic
History (Toronto and London: Dundurn Press 1985), 165-167.
33 Canada-Ontario Boundary Act 1889, 52-53 Vic. c. 28 (U.K.).
34 Anthony J. Hall, ‘The St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company versus the Queen: Indian Land Rights as a 
factor in Federal-Provincial Relations in Nineteenth-Century Canada’ in Kerry Abel and Jean Friesen, eds. 
Aboriginal Resource Use in Canada: Historical and Legal Aspects (Winnipeg, Manitoba: University of Manitoba 
Press, 1991) 267, 271-272.
35 Before the Supreme Court of Canada counsel for Ontario argued that Dominion’s position “could not be put 
forward on the part of the Dominion without operating as a fraud on the rights of the Province of Ontario.” St. 
Catherines Milling and Lumber Co. v the Queen [1887] 13 S.C.R. 577, 595.
36 St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co, 48.
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Ontario argued that the title to lands occupied by the aboriginals and over which aboriginal title
had not been extinguished had always been in the Crown (and thus ‘belonging to the several
Provinces  of Canada,  Nova Scotia,  and New Brunswick at  the Union’ under s  109) and the
aboriginal tenure was not analogous to fee simple. ‘Their title was in the nature of a personal
right of occupation during the pleasure of the Crown, and it was not a legal or equitable title in
the ordinary sense.’37 As Crown land subject to Indian occupancy, Ontario took fee simple title in
the area once the aboriginal interest was extinguished by treaty by virtue of s 109. 
The Judicial Committee agreed for the most part with Ontario. Lord Watson, while agreeing with
the Dominion that the tribes had a property right in their lands, nevertheless did not find that
aboriginal title was equivalent to fee simple in the territory surrendered by the treaty. Rather,
Watson noted, ‘[t]he Crown has all along has a present proprietary estate in the land, upon which
the Indian title was a mere burden.’38  As such, the ‘tenure of the Indians was a personal and
usufructuary right, dependent upon the good will of the sovereign’ which arose from the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 itself. 39 As s 109 provided that Ontario held the beneficial interest in all
Crown lands,  subject  ‘to  any  Interest  other  than  that  of  the  Province’ the  1873  Dominion-
Saulteaux Ojibwa treaty extinguished Ojibwa Indian title while concomitantly vesting the land in
the Crown-in-Right of Ontario. 
For those advocating the doctrine of provincial rights, Ontario’s argument in St. Catherine’s was
about its own autonomy and the exclusiveness of its jurisdiction, as well as the equality of the
Crown-in-right of the Province with the Crown-in-right of Canada. From this perspective, even
though Ontario was not party to the treaty and the surrender of Indian title was made to the
Dominion, the province as direct delegate of the imperial Crown held the proprietary interest in
the lands. Ontario’s interest in the ‘crown’ lands within its boundaries was not only superior to
those  of  third  party  purchasers,  but  equal  to  the  claims  of  the  other  imperial  delegate,  the
37 Ibid 49. This argument was made before the Judicial Committee. Ontario’s argument before the Supreme Court 
of Canada and the lower courts was even less disposed towards the existence of tribal title. Before the lower courts 
Ontario argued that “No title beyond that of occupancy was ever recognized by the crown as being in the Indians, 
and this recognition was based upon public policy and not upon any legal right in the aboriginal inhabitants.” St. 
Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co, 597.
38 St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co [12].
39 Ibid [6].
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Dominion government. This claim was based on the idea that Ontario continued to hold all the
natural resources, land, powers and prerogatives previously held by the Province of Canada prior
to Confederation and which devolved to Ontario on Confederation. Moreover, Ontario’s claim is
superior  and  prior  to  that  of  the  Dominion  because  it  derived  directly  from  the  Royal
Proclamation of 1763 and the administration of the lands by the Province of Canada prior to the
creation of Canada.40 Lord Watson, who several years later held in the 1896 Local Prohibition
case that Ontario had the authority to regulate liquor under s 92 because the United Province
Canada had regulated liquor prior to Confederation41,  clearly subscribes to this provincial rights
position regarding the earlier relationship between the Crown and the pre-Confederation: 
Had the Indian inhabitants of the area in question released their interest in it to the Crown at any time
between 1840 and the date of that Act, it does not seem to admit of doubt, and it was not disputed by
the learned counsel for the Dominion, that all revenues derived from its being taken up for settlement,
mining, lumbering, and other purposes would have been the property of the Province of Canada.42
As such, the Constitution Act 1867, by s 109 is ‘sufficient to give to each Province, subject to the
administration and control of its own Legislature, the entire beneficial interest of the Crown in all
lands within its boundaries, which at the time of the union were vested in the Crown…’43 Under
the doctrine of provincial autonomy, the balance of the federal structure is maintained.44 The
province, as the Privy Council noted in  Hodge v. The Queen has ‘authority as plenary and as
40 “The territory in dispute has been in Indian occupation from the date of the proclamation until 1873. During that 
interval of time Indian affairs have been administered successively by the Crown, by the Provincial Governments, 
and (since the passing of the British North America Act, 1867), by the Government of the Dominion. The policy of 
these administrations has been all along the same in this respect, that the Indian inhabitants have been precluded 
from entering into any transaction with a subject for the sale or transfer of their interest in the land, and have only 
been permitted to surrender their rights to the Crown by a formal contract, duly ratified in a meeting of their chiefs 
or head men convened for the purpose. Whilst there have been changes in the administrative authority, there has 
been no change since the year 1763 in the character of the interest which its Indian inhabitants had in the lands 
surrendered by the treaty.” Ibid 54 [emphasis added].
41 The Attorney-General for Ontario v The Attorney General for the Dominion of Canada (Canada) [1896] UKPC 
20 (9 May 1896).
42 St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co, 55.
43 Ibid 57.
44 “Their Lordships are, however, unable to assent to the argument for the Dominion founded on s 92(24). There 
can be no à priori probability that the British Legislature, in a branch of the statute which professes to deal only with
the distribution of legislative power, intended to deprive the Provinces of rights which are expressly given them in 
that branch of it which relates to the distribution of revenues and assets. The fact that the power of legislating for 
Indians, and for lands which are reserved to their use, has been entrusted to the Parliament of the Dominion is not in 
the least degree inconsistent with the right of the Provinces to a beneficial interest in these lands, available to them 
as a source of revenue whenever the estate of the Crown is disencumbered of the Indian title.” Ibid 59.
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ample within the limits prescribed by sect. 92 as the Imperial parliament in the plenitude of its
power’ could bestow.45 
B The Canadian Federation and Aboriginal Rights
1. Usufructuary Nature of Aboriginal Rights and Title 
After Lord Watson’s holding, the previously held notion of common law aboriginal title, which
implied  a  legally  cognisable  beneficial  use  to  the  land  burdening  the  Crown’s  underlying
paramount title, was equated with personal usufructuary aboriginal rights to hunt, fishing and
gather undertaken for subsistence and cultural reasons.46 Prior to  St. Catherine’s, the use that
Indian tribes put to land was not wholly determinative of the legal efficacy their interest. Tribal
occupancy rights provided the tribe with full use of the soil and enabled the tribe to use the
territory  as  they  thought  appropriate.47 Aboriginal  use  led  to  legally  efficacious  interests  at
common law; as evidenced by Justice Strong’s dissent before the Supreme Court of Canada in
St. Catherines Milling:
In reference to Indian habits and modes of life and the hunting grounds of the tribes were as much in
their actual occupation as the cleared fields of the whites, and this was the tenure of Indian lands by
the laws of all the colonies.48
Instead  Watson reduced the  ‘usufruct’ reserved in  the  Proclamation  to  encompass  the  entire
content of aboriginal title. The newly conceived usufructuary right was not an estate in land or
any sort of efficacious legal right. Rather it was akin to a revocable licence to hunt, fish and
gather which imposed no legal impediment to the Crown’s underlying proprietary title and the
uses to which the territory might be put. This conflation of aboriginal title and aboriginal rights,
which then consisted of various traditional use rights, is evident in the 1921 “Star Chrome” case.
In this case Lord Duff emphasises this aspect of aboriginal title:
While the language of the statute of 1850 undoubtedly imports a legislative acknowledgment of a right
inherent in the Indians to enjoy the lands appropriated to their use under the superintendence and
45 Hodge v The Queen [1883] 9 AC 117, 132.
46 Attorney-General. for Canada v Attorney-General. for Ontario [1897] AC 199; Ontario Mining Company v 
Seybold [1903] AC 73.
47 Brain Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title (Studies in Aboriginal 
Rights No. 2) (Saskatoon, Sask: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983), 31-38.
48 St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co, 612 (Strong J. dissenting citing Kent’s Commentaries and Mitchel v The 
United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835)).
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management  of  the  Commissioner  of  Indian  Lands,  their  Lordships  think  the  contention  of  the
Province to be well founded to this extent, that the right recognized by the statute is a usufructuary
right only and a personal right in the sense that it is in its nature inalienable except by surrender to the
Crown. 49 
As such, though the courts continued to hold notions of aboriginal title and usufructuary rights
conceptually distinct, in practice the concepts were merged. Aboriginal title was either ‘defined’
as  a  ‘burden’ on  the  Crown’s  interest,  which  was  subsequently  extinguished  by  treaty  or
legislation,  or  it  was  defined  as  an  aboriginal  right  to  traditionally  harvest  various  natural
resources. The reasoning of Justice McGillivray in the 1932 decision R. v. Wesley is indicative of
the melding of the concepts:
It is thus clear that whether it be called a title, an interest, or a burden on the Crown's title, the Indians
are  conceded to have obtained  definite  rights  under this  proclamation [of  1763] in  the territories
therein mentioned which certainly included the right to hunt and fish at will all over those lands in
which they held such interest.50
Such a legal conclusion would clearly facilitate settlement and economic exploitation. The notion
that aboriginal title gave rise to traditional natural resource gathering rights fits well with the
colonial impulse for economic development and improvement. It also reflected political reality,
in that judicial protection of aboriginal title could not threaten non-aboriginal uses premised on
liberal  economic  principles  or  federal/provincial  regulatory  regimes.  By  generally  treating
aboriginal title and aboriginal rights as mutually constitutive, the courts avoided any discussion
of  whether  the  holder  of  un-extinguished  aboriginal  title  had  the  right  ‘to  use  it  [the  land]
according to their own discretion.’51
This  notion  changed with  the  recognition  of  aboriginal  title  by  the  Supreme Court  of
49 Attorney-General for Quebec v Attorney-General for Canada [1921] 1 AC 401, 408 (P.C.) [“Star Chrome” case] 
Lord Duff wrote at p. 410 in his speech: “The object of the Act of 1850, as declared in the recitals already quoted, is 
to make better provision for preventing encroachments upon the lands appropriated to the use of Indian tribes and 
for the defence of their rights and privileges, language which does not point to an intention of enlarging or in any 
way altering the quality of the interest conferred upon the Indians by the instrument of appropriation or other 
source of title; and the view that the Act was passed for the purpose of affording legal protection for the Indians in 
the enjoyment of property occupied by them or appropriated to their use, and of securing a legal status for benefits to
be enjoyed by them, receives some support from the circumstance that the operation of the Act appears to extend to 
lands occupied by Indian tribes in that part of Quebec which, not being within the boundaries of the Province as laid 
down in the Proclamation of 1763, was, subject to the pronouncements of that Proclamation in relation to the rights 
of the Indians, a region in which the Indian title was still in 1850, to quote the words of Lord Watson, ‘a personal 
and usufructuary right dependent upon the good-will of the Sovereign [emphasis added].”
50 R v Wesley [1932] 2 WWR 337, 348 (Alta.S.C.).
51 Johnson v M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 681, 688 (1825).
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Canada in the 1973 decision  Calder v.  Attorney-General of  British Columbia.52 Calder
expressly  overruled  St.  Catherine's on  aboriginal  title  being  a  usufructuary  right  and
created by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and recognised that aboriginal title existed by
virtue of prior occupation of North America.53 Later in Guerin v. The Queen, the Court held
that whilst the Crown acquired while radical or underlying title at the time of sovereignty
such title was burdened by the ‘pre-existing legal right’  based on the use and occupation of
the land prior to European arrival.54  This ‘independent legal interest’ gives rise to a  sui
generis fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown55and  extends beyond traditional hunting,
fishing and gathering activities to include the right to manage and govern the land. ‘[I]t has
become accepted in Canadian law,’ Chief Justice Lamar states in Van der Peet;
that  aboriginal  title,  and  aboriginal  rights  in  general,  derive  from historic  occupation  and  use  of
ancestral  lands  by  the  natives  and  do  not  depend  on  any  treaty,  executive  order  or  legislative
enactment…56 
Subsequently in 2014 the Supreme Court recognised aboriginal title for the first time (with a
concomitant right to manage and govern the land) in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia.57
Nevertheless, Canadian law continues to be effected by the historic adherence to  aboriginal
rights qua usufructuary rights. This is most evident in the post 1982 aboriginal jurisprudence
which has developed a site specific aboriginal rights jurisprudence based on the cultural salience
of an activity. Consistent with the conception of a non-proprietary interest, the Supreme Court
has  stated  that  scope  and  content  aboriginal  rights  are  not  ‘general  and  universal,  but  are
determined on a case-by-case basis, and they are not dependent upon an underlying claim for
aboriginal title.58 As such, cultural and usufructuary activities are both the probative evidence for
52 Calder et al. v Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] SCR 313.
53 The Court further elaborated on the nature of Aboriginal title and rights in Delgamuukw v British Columbia 
[1997] 3 SCR 1010, [117] where the Court noted: “[T]he content of aboriginal title can be summarized by two 
propositions: first, that aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held 
pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, customs and 
traditions which are integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures; and second, that those protected uses must not be 
irreconcilable with the nature of the group's attachment to that land.”
54 Guerin v The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 379-82. (Dicksen, J concurrance).
55 Ibid, 385.
56 R. v Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, [112].
57 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia [2014] 2 SCR 257.
58 [A]boriginal rights are highly fact specific -- the existence of an aboriginal right is determined through 
consideration of the particular distinctive culture, and hence of the specific practices, customs and traditions, of the 
aboriginal group claiming the right. The rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) are not rights held uniformly by 
all aboriginal peoples in Canada; the nature and existence of aboriginal rights vary in accordance with the variety of 
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asserting the claim as well as the entire content of that claim, should it be recognised.  
Thus:
Where an aboriginal group has shown that a particular activity, custom or tradition taking place on the
land was integral to the distinctive culture of that group then, even if they have not shown that their
occupation and use of the land was sufficient to support a claim of title to the land, they will have
demonstrated that they have an aboriginal right to engage in that practice, custom or tradition.59
Most  aboriginal  rights  claims  have  some  geographical  element,  but  the  claim  itself  is  not
dependent upon a prior finding of aboriginal title by the court:
A protected aboriginal right falling short of aboriginal title may nonetheless have an important link to
the land. An aboriginal practice, custom or tradition entitled to protection as an aboriginal right will
frequently be limited to a specific territory or location, depending on the actual pattern of exercise of
such an activity prior to contact. As such, an aboriginal right will often be defined in site-specific
terms, with the result that it can only be exercised upon a specific tract of land.60
However, solicitous to the First Nations in today’s jurisprudential environment, the idea of a
stand alone aboriginal right to exercise particular subsistence and cultural activities over an area
without rising to the requisite level of aboriginal title flows  directly  from St. Catherine’s.. This
is  because  St.  Catherine’s  essentially  eliminated  any  legal  relevance  of  factual  and/or  legal
‘occupancy’ of a particular territory by a particular tribe as a potential  source of proprietary
rights. Prior to  St. Catherine’s   it was presumed that  aboriginal occupancy, like occupancy of
territory more generally could serve as a basis for asserting proprietary rights over a territory.
This occupancy may be established in many different ways; from the building of dwellings,
planting fields, by using specific territory for hunting and fishing or otherwise exploiting various
resources. When considering aboriginal occupation, the legal character is based on the aboriginal
societies’ traditional way of life. This will vary among tribes and be dependent upon a ‘group's
size, manner of life, material resources, and technological abilities, and the character of the lands
claimed’.61   After  St  Catherine’s  the nexus between occupancy and title  was severed.  As a
province  under  sec.  109 held  the  proprietary  interest  in  the  land,  and federal  authority  was
limited to legislation over the tribes, the necessity of tying hunting, fishing, and gathering rights
to aboriginal title disappeared. In St. Catherine’s  the rights were understood as extending across
aboriginal cultures and traditions which exist in this country. R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, [65].
59 Ibid 26.
60 R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, 167.
61 R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, [49].
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territory reserved for Indians, whether or not a particular tribe occupied it, because the rights
were:  1)  simple  usufructs  or  cultural  activities;  and  2)  conceived  of  as  flowing  from  the
Proclamation of 1763. As such the rights can extend to territory over which the tribe did not have
common law aboriginal title because aboriginal title was neither legally cognizable nor relevant
for government policymakers concerned with Indian tribes. Rather the basis of the right is not
title and possession of a particular tract of territory (thus rendering treaties of cession with the
tribe legally inefficacious) but the historically vague quasi-fiduciary “Honour of the Crown” to
provide for the First Nations. 
This conception is reflected by how Crown land in the Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta was
reconciled with aboriginal and treaty promises rights under the Natural Resource Transfer Acts
(NRTAs).  In these territories (unlike in Ontario), the Crown Land did not go to the respective
provinces when they came into existence because of the 1871 federal purchase from HBC. The
Dominion held the territory in fee simple subject only to aboriginal title and the occupying tribes
ceded  the  territory  from 1871  to  1921.  Each  NRTA contains  an  identical  provision,  which
supersedes and replaces any treaty obligations regarding hunting, fishing and gathering.62 The
NRTAs preclude provincial regulation of aboriginal hunting, trapping and fishing for food at all
seasons of the year “on all unoccupied Crown lands and on any other lands to which the said
Indians may have a right of access.”63 It makes no provision for the exercise of any rights based
on aboriginal title per se as any tribal member can exercise the rights across the entire province.
As such, the now constitutionally protected s 35 aboriginal rights, although grounded on the one
hand in aboriginal culture and law, and aboriginal occupancy and use of particular territory on
the  other,  nevertheless  privilege  the  cultural  and non-territorial  nature of  aboriginal  hunting,
fishing, and gathering rights. The basis of the right is not dependent on title and possession of a
particular tract of territory but  the historically vague obligation of the Crown to provide for
aboriginals and allow them to secure food. This is a significant departure from the doctrine of
aboriginal title and jurisprudence in other states. In other states, an aboriginal right to hunt and
fish is generally parasitic upon a finding of aboriginal title. 
62 “The Agreement had the effect of merging and consolidating the treaty rights of the Indians in the area and 
restricting the power of the provinces to regulate the Indians' right to hunt for food. The right of Indians to hunt for 
sport or commercially could be regulated by provincial game laws but the right to hunt for food could not.” 
Moosehunter v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 282, 285.
63 R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, 913-4. 
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Moreover, while the Canadian conception of aboriginal title includes the right to use the land for
non-traditional purposes, The Supreme Court has held that those uses must be ‘reconciled with
the communal and ongoing nature of the group’s attachment to the land.’64 This limitation is
consistent with the underlying logic of a usufructuary rights which allows for uses of property
without diminishing or damaging it.65 Moreover, the idea is consistent with a culturally prescribe
non-territorial source for the rights as the extent of permitted uses is tied to historic cultural uses
and meanings relating to the groups existence. While such uses are important as evidence and
historic  occupancy and possession,  there use to  limit  the scope and extent  of the aboriginal
property interest once it has been recognised is unnecessarily circular. The result is that ‘non-
traditional’ uses are likely to be understood by the courts through a subsistence and ‘common
pool resource’ paradigm,66 seriously undermining tribal governmental competence and property
rights. 
2. No Sovereign Tribal Authority absent Statutory Recognition  
The  St. Catherine’s Court grounded aboriginal title and rights as a  legal right sourced in the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 and granted the exclusive authority of the province over non-reserve
lands under the  Constitution Act 1867. As a result, later courts had little difficulty dispensing
with the idea of pre-contact inherent tribal sovereignty, residual authority (in those areas not
legislated for by the Dominion and the provinces) or tribal law that could be a separate source of
governing authority.  The continued sovereignty of aboriginal tribes,  as evidenced by judicial
recognition  of  aboriginal  law,  cultural  practice  and  historic  occupation  and  use  of  natural
resources, does not survive the assertion of European sovereignty: 
It is worth recalling that while British policy towards the native population was based on respect for
their right to occupy their traditional lands, a proposition to which the Royal Proclamation of 1763
bears witness, there was from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and
indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown...67
64 . Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n 57, [67].
65 L. F. E. Goldie, ‘Note: Title and Use (And Usufruct) — An Ancient Distinction Too Oft Forgot’ (1985) 79 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 689, 690-695.
66 For a discussion of the implications of common pool resource issues see  Elinor Ostrom, Governing The 
Commons The evolution of institutions for collective action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 29-37.
67 R. v Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1103.
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Early treaty cases, which denied the legal efficacy to treaties unless the terms were enacted into
statute, also denied the existence of an independent sovereign aboriginal nation, or the existence
of  residual  sovereignty,  with whom the Crown negotiated.68 For  example,  the court  in  R. v.
Syliboy emphatically  denied  the  existence  of  Aboriginal  (Mi’kmaq)  sovereignty  despite  the
international aspect of the 1725 and 1752 treaties. 69
In the post-Constitution Act 1982 decision  R. v. Simon, the Supreme Court held that the same
treaty dismissed by the  Syliboy Court had not been extinguished and continued to have some
legal  force but  refused to  apply rules  of international  law to determine whether  it  had been
terminated. On the crucial question of whether the tribe had the capacity to enter into the treaty,
the Simon Court, rather than positing a mutual compact between juridical equals, instead relied
on a 1929 commentary critical of Syliboy which had noted:
Ordinarily "full powers" to the British specially conferred are essential to the proper negotiating of a
treaty [these were not given to Nova Scotia Governor Hopson who negotiated and signed the 1752
Treaty], but the Indians were not on a par with a sovereign state and fewer formalities were required in
their case.70
The acceptance of unquestioned political sovereignty precludes judicial recognition of inherent
aboriginal governmental authority, eliminating tribal law as a parallel source of authority within
the Canadian polity. From the perspective of the Canadian colonial state such a result was not
undesirable. Federal and Provincial jurisdiction was conceived as occupying the entire field of
governmental authority and competence. While the tribes could exercise governmental authority
over their members and reserves in such legislation as the Indian Act 1876, such authority was
delegated and subject to defeasement when inconsistent with the policy and legal objectives of
the Canadian state. Indeed from the perspective of the colonial state, a notion that the tribes held
a  fee  simple  interest  in  their  lands,  would  necessarily  imply  a  legal  competence  and
governmental capacity with the attendant ability generate legally efficacious and competitive
rights to those exercised by the federal government and the provinces.71 A Dominion victory in
St. Catherine’s   could arguably have established an alternative legal narrative: that there is an
‘aboriginal law as law’ which allows for, and underpins a tribal conveyance of territory and other
68 The Privy Council held that the 1850 Robinson Treaty was nothing more than a personal obligation of the 
governor and suggested that the use of international law concepts applicable to aboriginal treaties is not appropriate. 
Attorney-General For Canada v Attorney-General For Ontario (Indian Annuities case) [1897] AC 199, [14].
69 Rex v Syliboy [1929] 1 D.L.R. 307, 313.
70 Simon v The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, 400.
71 Gordon Christie, ‘Justifying Principles of Treaty Interpretation’ (2000) 26 Queen's L.J. 143.
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rights, and their ‘possession’ in state law would, in part, require a recognition and incorporation
of their law into provincial and federal law.
What was the impact today of the failure to recognize inherent aboriginal rights without the
concomitant  recognition  of  residual  aboriginal  sovereignty  which  resulted  from the  Judicial
Committee  sourcing  Indian  rights  in  the  Proclamation  of  1763?  First,  failure  to  recognize
residual sovereignty means that the inherent nature of aboriginal law cannot create additional
practices  but  can  only  elaborate  the  ones  practiced  historically  prior  to  European  contact.
Aboriginal rights cannot arise after contact with the Europeans:
The fact that Europeans in North America engaged in the same practices, customs or traditions as
those under which an aboriginal right is claimed will only be relevant to the aboriginal claim if the
practice, custom or tradition in question can only be said to exist because of the influence of European
culture. If the practice, custom or tradition was an integral part of the aboriginal community’s culture
prior to contact with Europeans, the fact that that practice, custom or tradition continued after the
arrival of Europeans, and adapted in response to their arrival, is not relevant to determination of the
claim; European arrival and influence cannot be used to deprive an aboriginal group of an otherwise
valid claim to an aboriginal right. On the other hand, where the practice, custom or tradition arose
solely as a response to European influences then that practice, custom or tradition will not meet the
standard for recognition of an aboriginal right.72
Second, it precludes the idea that tribes have ‘reserved’ rights in the determining the content of
the agreement similar to those posited by the Reserved Rights Doctrine in the United States.  73
This American doctrine is premised on the idea that a treaty is not as a ‘grant of rights to the
Indians,  but a grant of rights from them -- a reservation of those granted.’74 In contrast,  the
Canadian judicial construction assumes a more totalizing prior defeasance of tribal property and
sovereign interests before the treaty was negotiated. While neither the American nor the British
or the Canadians  construed treaty making as a diplomatic act between juridical co-equals, the
treaty recognition and interpretive methodologies taken by the American courts  to retain the
notion and echo of tribal sovereignty.   One impact of the importation of the reserved rights
doctrine  would be the expansion of  treaty rights retained by the tribes. Unless a treaty clearly
dismembers the legal existence of the tribe, sovereign authority is necessarily reserved to the
72 R. v Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, [73]. (Lamar C.J.C.).
73 See R. v Sioui [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, 1052-3 where the Court notes that relations with the tribes were similar to 
relations between independent states. 
74 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), 381.
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tribe because of the rule that when a consensual alteration of rights is made by international
treaty the “failure to delegate an incident of sovereignty leaves it undisturbed.”75 As it appears
that many treaty signatories did not intend to concede their rights to self-government, territory or
uses not specifically demanded by the Europeans, there would be potentially a great expansion of
aboriginal governmental competence and rights should the doctrine be adopted.76 Moreover, the
retained rights imply an evolution and expansion of rights as the political, social and economic
circumstances change across time. 
Third,  the  legal  recognition  of  sovereignty,  either  historically  or  as  a  residual  characteristic
implies that the tribes have an inherent constitutionally protected right to manage the natural
resources under tribal law as well as being able to legally prevent non-aboriginal resource uses.
In  the  area  of  hunting,  fishing  and gathering  rights,  the  idea  carries  with it  the  notion  that
management of the resources should be done by the aboriginal group or include of tribal law
relating to the usage. 
In any event, the failure to recognize the residual sovereignty lessens the ability of the tribes to
expand  the  range  of  constitutionally  protected  practices  under  s  35  today,  absent  additional
agreements concluded under s 35(3). While aboriginal rights are recognised as pre-dating the
Canadian state,  and contemporary jurisprudence understands tribal law, which supports those
rights, as flowing from an independent juridical source, the source is not ‘sovereign’ in the same
sense as the Canadian state. Thus, it is not surprising that the rights guaranteed under s 35 seem
not to be included in the ‘living tree’ analysis used when discussing other constitutional rights.
This  analytical  approach  in  its  usual  form privileges  a  judicial  interpretation  conferring  the
‘widest amplitude’ for the exercise of authority under ss 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act 1867
and  recognises  the  ongoing evolution  of  rights  the  rights  found in  the  Charter.  Instead,  the
reconciliation process outlined by the Supreme Court under its current s 35 jurisprudence, is
75 Maureen Davies, ‘Aspects of Aboriginal Rights in International Law’ in Bradford W. Morse, ed., Aboriginal 
Peoples and the Law (Ottawa, Ont.: Carleton University Press, 1985) 16, 24.
76 See Jon William Parmenter, ‘Pontiac’s War: Forging New Links in the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain 1758-
1766’ (1997) 44 Ethnohistory  617; Dorothy V Jones, License for Empire Colonialism by Treaty in Early America 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 73.
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meant to give modern expression to traditional uses, practices and customs as they existed in
history without creating ‘new’ uses or practices.77
3 Historic Treaty Rights limited to Usufructs and Cultural Practices 
While enforceable treaty rights are an important feature in Canadian jurisprudence today, the
limited legal efficacy of treaty provisions prior to 1982 was an important result of the Privy
Council jurisprudence. Lord Watson’s decision set aside any notion that aboriginal treaties might
be legally enforceable or inform statutory commitments to the tribes. The effect was that treaty
rights  (sourced  in  international  and  contract  law  in  other  common  law  jurisdictions)  were
equated to common law aboriginal title and rights in Canadian law. Absent specific statutory
enactments related to certain treaty obligations the source, extent and extinguishment the same
for common law and treaty rights.78
As such, a Canadian-First  Nations treaty conveyed no possessory interest  and, as mentioned
above, the tribes did not have the competent legal personality to enter an enforceable treaty
contract. This inevitable extension of Lord Watson’s reasoning was made manifest in subsequent
litigation regarding the Ontario’s obligation under the federal cession treaties. Moreover, federal
authority to procure resources from the provinces as part  of the process by which the tribes
obtained services and commodities in exchange for the land ceded was similarly restricted. For
example, in  Ontario Mining Co. v. Seybold  the Judicial Committee held that a treaty whereby
various reserve lands which were turned over to federal government on the condition that the
proceeds of  land and mineral sales  be returned to the tribes was unenforceable, because the land
belonged to the province after aboriginal title had been extinguished.79 Similarly in  Attorney-
General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario the Judicial Committee determined that the
1850 treaties between the Governor of the United Province of Canada and the Ojibwa were
77 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. 2 looseleaf (Scarborough, Ont.: Thomson Carswell, 1997), s. 
33.7; Michael Coyle, ‘Loyalty and Distinctiveness: A New Approach to the Crown's Fiduciary Duty Toward 
Aboriginal Peoples’ (2003) 40 Alta L. Rev. 841 at 844. See also Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 
217, 248.
78 An example of such statutory implementation is found in the Natural Resource Transfer Agreements (NRTAs), 
which transferred federal Crown lands to the three Prairie Provinces, incorporated presumed and agreed upon 
aboriginal and treaty rights to hunt and gather for food outside of the reserves into statute. The Natural Resource 
Transfer Acts for each Prairie Province have been renamed and consolidated in the Constitution Act 1930 are found 
at R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 26. The NRTAs have constitutional status. See also R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393.
79 Ontario Mining Co. v Seybold [1903] AC 73.
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unenforceable against the province.80 The Dominion, for itself and on behalf of the tribe argued
that Ontario, as owner of the land surrendered due to s 109 and was liable for the increased
annuities  and  payments  due  under  the  treaty.81 It  argued  that  the  transfer  of  land  that  was
effectuated by the treaty included an aboriginal right to increased payments, which had been
agreed to as part of the 1850 treaties. From this perspective the treaty had created a charge upon
Ontario’s title similar to an encumbrance or charge. This idea of a treaty created interest was
noted by the Privy Council: ‘In substance,’ Lord Watson wrote, ‘Indian annuities form a charge
upon the lands, and their proceeds arising after Union….’. However, the interest was not a legal
interest. The Committee “had no difficulty” concluding that:
Under the treaties, the Indians obtained no right to their annuities, whether original or augmented,
beyond a promise and agreement,  which was nothing more than a personal obligation by its  [the
Province of Canada] governor…that the latter should pay the annuities as and when they became due;
that  the  Indians  obtained  no  right  which  gave  them  any  interest  in  the  territory  which  they
surrendered…82
Thus the 1850 treaties did not provide the Ojibwa with any legal or equitable rights to payment
from Ontario.83  As a ‘personal obligation’ of the Governor, the interest was not enforceable in
rem such that its contractual or treaty obligations would attach to the ceded land when the United
Province of Canada was reorganised into Ontario and Quebec.  While the holding represented the
idea that aboriginal interests over the territory they used and occupied were non-proprietary, it
also assumed a particular notion of Ontario within the constitutional framework.
With the characterisation of the treaty obligation as ‘personal’, the Privy Council accepted the
historical notion that the Canadian colonies all enjoyed a direct relationship with the imperial
Crown and that continued under the Constitution Act 1867 (despite that Ontario and Quebec did
not in fact exist as separate jurisdictions). As such the federal and provincial governments were
co-equal sovereign creations of the Imperial  Crown, which also maintained separate and co-
80 Attorney-General For Canada v Attorney-General For Ontario (Indian Annuities case) [1897] AC 199, [14].
81 The aboriginals had approached the Government of Canada in 1873 for increased annuities under the treaties.
82 Ibid, 213.
83 The issue of whether treaties created a legally cognizable interest in Canada was not completely settled until the 
end of the 19th century. There was strong arguments in favor of treaty rights which have been lost in the 
historiography and jurisprudence which evolved from St. Catherine’s Milling. With his dissenting opinion In re 
Indian Claims Canadian Supreme Court Justice Gwynne noted this line of argument. Province of Ontario v 
Dominion of Canada and Province of Quebec; In re Indian Claims (1895) 25 S.C.R. 434, 511-512.
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ordinate relationships to the Imperial  Crown. Such a conception is  evident  in  Hodge v.  The
Queen where the Privy Council stated: 
They [the provincial legislatures] are in no sense delegates of, or acting under any mandate from the
Imperial Parliament. When the British North America Act enacted that there should be a Legislature
for Ontario, and that its Legislative Assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for the
province and for provincial purposes in relation to the matters enumerated in Sect. 92, it conferred
powers not in any sense exercised by delegation from or as agents of the Imperial Parliament, but
authority as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by Sect. 92 as the Imperial Parliament
in the plenitude of its power possesses and could bestow. 84
Before  Confederation,  the  Imperial  Crown  by  the  Royal  Proclamation  of  1763 and  each
individual  colony were  considered  capable  of  extinguishing aboriginal  rights,  either  through
legislation or by treaty provided colonial legislation or actions were not disallowed or reserved
by the Imperial Crown.85 However, Watson’s reference to the obligation of Canada’s Governor
towards  the signatory tribes  as  ‘personal’,  (i.e. as  analogous to  those ‘Head of  State’ treaty
commitments which conceived of inter-state relations as a personal relationship among sovereign
heads  of  state)86 underscores  the  notion  that  Ontario  continued  to  maintain  its  previous
relationship with the Imperial Crown; and it ‘sovereignty’ within its sphere of authority outlined
in the  Constitution Act 1867.  87 From such a perspective,  the treaty obligations of the United
Province of Canada could not attach to the land as a ‘trust’ obligation under s 109 because the
obligation was assumed by the Imperial Crown in the first instance without such a ‘trust’. To
84 Hodge v The Queen (Canada) [1883-1884] 9 AC 117, 132. In 1892, Lord Watson, summarily dismissed the 
argument that confederation had changed the relationship between the Crown and the provinces. “[I]in so far as 
regards those matters which, by sect. 92, are specially reserved for provincial legislation, the legislation of each 
province continues to be free from the control of the Dominion, and as supreme as it was before the passing of the 
Act.” Later Watson noted: “it [the province] derives no authority from the government of Canada and its status is in 
no way analogous to that of a municipal institution....” Liquidators of the Maritime Bank v Receiver General of New
Brunswick [1892] AC 437, 442. See also D. Michael Jackson The Crown and Canadian Federalism (Toronto: 
Dundurn Press, 2013), 93-96. 
85 Prior to Confederation the Crown-in-Right of the Province of Canada “had full power, by legislation, 
administrative acts and treaties, to unilaterally revoke Indian rights” based on the theory that no colonial act relating 
to aboriginals was disallowed or reserved for disapproval. A-G Ontario v Bear Island Foundation (1984) 49 O.R. 
(2d) 353, 468.
86 Hugo Cyr, Canadian Federalism and Treaty Powers: Organic Constitutionalism at Work (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter 
Lange, 2009), 22-25.
87 The Robinson Treaty was ratified by Governor General in Council and was never referred to the Colonial Office 
for approval. James Morrison, The Robinson Treaties: A Case Study, (31 March 1993) Report prepared for the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Treaty and Land Research Section, , 134-136 
https://uncaprcap.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/the-robinson-treaties-of-1850-morrison.pdf.
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hold  otherwise,  would  imply  a  change  in  the  ‘direct’ relationship  between  Ontario  and  the
Imperial Crown which existed prior to Confederation by way of the  Constitution Act 1867  at
Confederation. When considering relationships with aboriginals under pre-Confederation treaty
obligations,  this  purported  change would  seemingly  require  Ontario  to  be  a  delegate  of  the
Dominion Crown in areas of provincial jurisdiction; a result not contemplated by other Privy
Council jurisprudence at the time.
The result is that an aboriginal treaty does not give rise to legal obligations either in international
law (as  an  inchoate  obligation  prior  to  parliamentary approval  or  whether  it  is  approved or
enacted  into  law  by  parliament)  or  through  contract.  Rather  they  were  mere  promises  and
agreements that provide no legally enforceable rights. The Northwest Territory Court of Appeal
in R. v. Sikyea, noting Lord Watson’s dismissive language about the rights of aboriginals under
treaties in A-G for Canada v. A-G for Ontario stated:
While this refers [the non-legal obligation of the governor] only to the annuities payable under the
treaties, it is difficult to see that the other covenants in the treaties, including the one we are here
concerned with, can stand on any higher footing. It is always to be kept in mind that the Indians
surrendered their rights in the territory in exchange for these promises. This “promise and agreement”,
like any other, can, of course, be breached, and there is no law of which I am aware that would prevent
Parliament by legislation, properly within s. 91 of the B.N.A. Act, from doing so.88
The obligation and promises in the agreement are to be carried out ‘with an exactness which
honour and good conscience dictate’, but courts would not enforce the agreement against the
Crown should it fail to fulfill its obligations.89 
This  situation has  changed with the  enactment  of  s  35.  Today Canadian  law recognizes  the
governmental capacity and possessory interest embodied in land agreements with the various
tribes. Courts have utilized various interpretative approaches to expand and protect First Nation’s
interests in unextinguished historic treaties. Moreover, unlike aboriginal rights, whose content
depends on a judicial examination of pre-contact practices, the aboriginal activities are covered
by a treaty are those exercised at the time the agreement:
88 Regina. v Sikyea [1964], 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150 (N.W.T.C.A.) aff’d [1964] S.C.R. 642, 154.
89 Rex v. Wesley, [1932] 2 W.W.R. 337, 344 (Alta.S.C.); (McGillivray, J), 351 citing the Indian Annuities case when 
he noted that “In Canada, the Indian treaties appear to have been judicially interpreted as being mere promises and 
agreements.” 
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When considering a treaty,  a court  must take into account the context in which the treaties were
negotiated,  concluded and  committed  to  writing.  The treaties,  as  written  documents,  recorded  an
agreement that had already been reached orally and they did not always record the full extent of the
oral agreement.90
Nevertheless, these historic treaties or agreements, even where the enumerated and implied rights
remain  unextinguished,  neither  reserve  possessory  or  proprietary  rights  to  land  for  their
respective First Nations, nor are aboriginal rights claimed in the area parasitic upon the territories
delimited by the agreement.91 In those territories covered by cession treaties, tribal proprietary
rights to land must be found in federal and provincial legislation and cannot be sourced in the
treaty agreement.  While  usufructuary and cultural  uses outlined in  historic  treaties may find
protection  post-1982,  such  as  the  rights  to  fish  and  trade  for  necessaries,92 the  underlying
presumptions of Crown ownership and the non-sovereign nature of the tribal polity remains.
Thus  treaty  jurisprudence  largely  tracks  aboriginal  rights  jurisprudence  and  the  source  and
content of underlying Crown obligations toward tribal claims to more expansive uses of lands or
minerals is beyond judicial decision under treaty jurisprudence.93  
III CONCLUSION
Indigenous issues were implicated in the development of the colonial and national state because
they had initially controlled, had a colour of interest, or simply had a presence that was perceived
by the settlers as a hindrance to development. First Nations generally did not accept the settlers’
liberal notions of property and economic development. The fear that Indigenous interests would
intrude upon or preclude settlers (and often squatters) property rights or create an indigenous
veto on the economic development of the country was evident in many cases where a tribunal
refused to recognize or protect indigenous interests.94 In the seminal aboriginal cases before the
90  R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, [52].
91 See Sidney L. Harring, Native People in Nineteenth-Century Canadian Jurisprudence (Toronto: Osgoode Society
for Canadian Legal History by University of Toronto Press 1998) at 35-81; Darlene Johnson, “The Quest of the Six 
Nations Confederacy for Self-Determination” (1986) 44 U.T.Fac.L.Rev. 1.
92 R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, [49].
93  For example, hunting, fishing and gathering rights may be regulated for a variety of reasons. In all cases the 
federal and provincial regulation of an aboriginal or treaty right must be done in accordance with the criteria set 
down in R. v. Sparrow. The criteria which applies to determine permissible regulation of a Treaty rights is the same 
as that set forth in Sparrow. R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771.
94 St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co, 649 (Tashereau, J.).
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Judicial  Committee  and  elsewhere,  the  Dominion,  in  asserting  aboriginal  interests,  was  not
seeking to vindicate their pre-existing rights, nor was it asserting that aboriginal treaties created
legally enforceable obligations against the Dominion. It sought to have the rights recognized so it
could  control  and  appropriate  aboriginal  resources  on  the  basis  of  its  own  institutional
prerogatives  and  nation  building  program.  Nevertheless,  despite  the  endemic  racism  and
imperatives of economic development,  it  is  likely that the Dominion would have been more
protective of aboriginal rights.  With the subsequent vindication of the Doctrine of Provincial
rights,  the  institutional  interest  for  advocating  judicially  efficacious  aboriginal  rights
disappeared. At the same time, an opportunity to re-assert either common law aboriginal title or
treaty rights by a court seeking to vindicate a governmental right disappeared, because neither
the provinces nor the federal government were ever in the position where a judicial vindication
of an aboriginal interest would have such broad constitutional consequences. 
Presently,  the  most  significant  feature  of  Canadian  aboriginal  rights  is  the  constitutional
protection afforded them by s 35. When reviewing the generally protective post-1982 decisions,
one can see the impact of the earlier decisions and the subsequent vindication of the doctrine of
provincial autonomy and its subsequent incorporation into the jurisprudence. As Justice Binnie
noted:
The Constitution Act, 1982 ushered in a new chapter but it did not start a new book.  Within the
framework  of  s.  35(1)  regard  is  to  be  had  to  the  common law  ("what  the  law  has  historically
accepted") to enable a court to determine what constitutes an aboriginal right.95
Like the rights-based jurisprudence Constitutional Act, 1982 which arose from conflicts over the
status of Quebec in the Canadian federation, this earlier jurisprudence was generated by bitter
federal-provincial conflicts over the meaning and scope of the Constitution Act 1867. The result
of these contests were for the most part in favor of the provinces: no enforceable treaty rights, the
conflation  of  usufructuary  rights  with  aboriginal  title,  and  failure  to  incorporate  notions  of
aboriginal sovereignty into Canadian law. These developments have affected the development of
the post-1982 law. First, while the rights themselves are considered inherent, the First Nations
(whose historic occupation, use, and possession of the territory gave rise to these inherent rights)
have  neither  the  inherent  right  to  self-government  or  residual  inherent  sovereignty  absent
95 Mitchell v M.N.R. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 29, [115] (Binnie, J. concurrence).
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statutory  recognition  in  Canadian  law.  Second,  because  First  Nations  rights  to  use  land  for
hunting,  fishing  and  gathering  were  equated  with  aboriginal  title,  post-1982  aboriginal
jurisprudence has developed a far ranging notion of aboriginal rights in contrast to aboriginal
title. Finally, the constitutional protection and content of aboriginal rights and treaty rights are
essentially the same. 
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